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Escape Into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the 
Surveillance Society 
The Eye: that horrible growing sense of a hostile will that strove with 
great power to pierce all shadows of cloud, and earth, and flesh, and to 
see you: to pin you under its deadly gaze, naked, immovable.1 
introduction 
Suppose that you move to a new town. To buy your home, you must allow 
the developer to install cameras in each room and record all interactions 
between you and your husband. To use the telephone, you must permit the 
telephone company to record and retain your conversations. To receive mail, 
you must allow the mail carrier to copy and index the contents. To access 
funds, you must permit the bank to record all purchases. Suppose, too, that 
much of this information can become available to government actors with a 
simple subpoena rather than the more stringent search warrant.2 It may sound 
incredible, but this is the reality for millions of people who live, work, and play 
in virtual worlds. 
The essential irony of virtual worlds is that populations seeking to build 
new lives away from the public eye are moving into an environment that is 
subject to constant surveillance. Virtual worlds currently operate like Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon prison.3 The Panopticon permitted a single guard in the 
center of the prison to monitor all of the prisoners. The same degree of 
 
1.  J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS 616 (Houghton Mifflin 1994) (1954). 
2.  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (permitting access to bank records with 
a subpoena and noting the “general rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party to 
obtain the records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant”). 
3.  JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995). 
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surveillance exists in virtual worlds. The denizens of virtual worlds are 
constantly under surveillance by “game gods,” the private companies that 
design, maintain, and administer virtual worlds.4 The game gods then must 
comply with government requests for call details, wiretaps, stored chatlogs, 
and other business records.5 The result: game gods’ cameras are on all the time 
and the footage reaches law enforcement and the intelligence community. 
I argue in this brief essay that as government enters virtual worlds it should 
respect basic privacy rights. For intelligence and law enforcement purposes, 
this most importantly includes the question of when government actors can 
and should access a U.S. person’s private communications. Further, I argue 
that private collection of personal information in virtual worlds is as much of a 
threat to privacy as government surveillance. 
reasonable expectations of privacy in virtual worlds 
The basic legal regime for privacy prevents the intelligence community and 
law enforcement from accessing a U.S. person’s private communications 
without a warrant supported by probable cause.6 The constitutional standard is 
one of a reasonable expectation of privacy,7 but courts have had some trouble 
hammering out what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy online.8 
The main point of contention is whether reasonable expectations of privacy are 
determined by what the government can collect or by what it ought to collect. 
The government can collect anything. So if the government refuses to respect 
privacy, then any expectation of privacy is unreasonable.9 The alternative is for 
courts to make a normative determination: when citizens reasonably act as 
 
4.  One very common example of this monitoring is the retention of chat logs, which the 
companies routinely record for customer assistance purposes.   
5.  For wiretaps and access to call details for voice over internet protocol, see Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000).  For access to recorded 
chatlogs via a subpoena, see Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(2), 2703(b) 
(2000); and Second Life: Terms of Service, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php at ¶ 6.1 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
6.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967).  
7.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that an expectation of privacy must be both 
subjectively held and objectively reasonable). 
8.  See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying a motion 
to suppress evidence based in part on a holding that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest in subscriber information). But see State v. Reid, 914 A.2d 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2007) (holding that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in ISP account 
information under the New Jersey state constitution). 
9.  See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 9, 39 (2004) (“[T]he reasonable expectation of privacy test is circular.”). 
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though their communications are private, courts must select rules that honor 
those expectations, even if government possesses the technology to access the 
information.10 Under this normative approach, the fact that government can 
wiretap telephones or see through bedroom walls with thermographic cameras 
does not reduce the expectations of privacy of U.S. persons in bed or on the 
phone.11 
In some ways, determining rational expectations of privacy in virtual 
worlds is easier than determining expectations of privacy over telephone lines, 
because computer technology allows virtual re-creation of real space. Virtual 
worlds recreate streets and bedrooms.12 In the real world, most street-corner 
conversations are public, and most bedroom conversations are private. Virtual 
world technology is intentionally designed to make humans act as though the 
virtual world is, at least in some respects, real. Thus, as a normative matter, 
when corporations choose to use technology intended to entice humans into 
acting as though they were safe in their own homes, or privately 
communicating with friends, the law ought to respect those expectations as it 
does in real life. I therefore argue that U.S. persons in virtual worlds possess a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, such that a search of their virtual homes and 
property should be subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
protecting u.s.  persons’  personal information in virtual 
worlds 
Government surveillance is only half of the problem. The other half is the 
untrammeled private collection of data. Companies collect information about 
consumers to maximize profit or to gain business advantage.13 Unfortunately, 
companies often lose control of the enormous amounts of information they 
 
10.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351-52 ("[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."). 
11.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the warrantless use of 
thermal imaging to explore otherwise unobservable details of a private home is a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 359 (finding a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in conversations over telephone lines). 
12.  See generally EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF 
ONLINE GAMES 6-9 (2005) (describing the nature of worlds created through video game 
technology).  
13.  DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 
623 (2d ed. 2006) (“An entire industry has arisen devoted to the creation of gigantic 
databases of personal information . . . .”). 
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have gathered, which threatens U.S. persons’ privacy.14  Congress has already 
begun to act in response to the threat of massive collection of U.S. persons’ 
data by companies that do not carefully protect that data.15 
But the more people live out their lives in virtual worlds, the more 
information can be data mined. Not only economic information like credit card 
numbers can be recorded in virtual worlds. The false anonymity of novel 
online environments has caused people to move their intimate lives online, 
where every act can be monitored.16 Eventually, every movement, every gesture 
in virtual worlds will be tracked and processed by private companies. The 
government should take the lead in protecting consumer privacy from private 
invasion by extending enforcement of law on data leaks17 to virtual worlds, by 
enforcing existing law requiring informed consent prior to the collection of 
personal information,18 and by enacting new law creating property rights in 
personal information so that consumers will have adequate control if they 
decide to sell their information. 
conclusion 
As people move their lives online, courts should recognize that rights move 
with them by articulating a reasonable expectation of online privacy. Rights to 
privacy do not stop at the gateway to virtual worlds. And the fact that 
surveillance in virtual worlds can be ubiquitous does not indicate that it should 
be. There is a serious danger that courts will determine that every aspect of a 
person’s virtual life can be collected by private companies and passed along to 
government actors subject to less stringent requirements than probable cause. 
This would be an unfortunate result: either a vibrant and important 
 
14.  Over 236 million records have been compromised in the United States since 2005. See 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, http:// 
www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
15.  See, e.g., Aaron Ricadela, Congress Takes Aim at Spyware, BusinessWeek.com, June 18, 2007, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2007/tc20070618_693312.htm. 
16.  See PETER LUDLOW & MARK WALLACE, THE SECOND LIFE HERALD: THE VIRTUAL TABLOID 
THAT WITNESSED THE DAWN OF THE METAVERSE 127-134 (2007) (detailing sexual practices 
in virtual worlds).  These sexual practices can be monitored and disclosed just as any other 
activity in a virtual world may be. 
17.  See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 913, 915 (2007) (“The latest example of regulation through disclosure is a requirement 
that companies notify individuals of data security incidents involving their personal 
information.”). 
18.  See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 4052.5 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008) (requiring “explicit prior 
consent” before financial institutions may share customer information). 
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technology would fail, or people would give up all privacy just to use the 
technology. 
Even if government actors take privacy in virtual worlds seriously, 
however, there remains the problem of private data collection. Virtual worlds 
are enormous cameras. As people live more of their lives online, they will 
provide more data that will then be collected and processed. Further, the rules 
that courts and legislators craft for virtual worlds will soon be applied to the 
real world because the two will begin to overlap. The next generation of 
computers will be small enough to wear, and powerful enough to record and 
parse everything around them. We will all record each other’s every action. The 
Panopticon is a virtual world problem, but it will not remain so for very long. 
 
Joshua Fairfield is an Associate Professor of Law at Washington & Lee University 
School of Law. He writes and speaks on the governance and economics of virtual 
worlds. 
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